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INTRODUCTION
A well-dressed salesperson is explaining to a potential customer,
Bernie, an investment opportunity that will provide high returns with little
to no risk. All Bernie has to do is deposit a percentage of his salary each
month into a larger fund that will be invested in the stock markets by
experts. When Bernie needs money someday, the funds will have grown
exponentially. Additionally, some of Bernie’s hard-earned money will be
used to pay out customers who have invested during prior years because
the investments are not generating a large enough return to pay everyone
what was promised.
At first Bernie thinks he is hearing a pitch for a classic Ponzi scheme,1
but, as it turns out, the salesperson is giving a description of a public
pension system.2 Scholars have argued that public pensions are similar to
Ponzi schemes, with the major difference being that the latter are illegal.3
This criticism may be harsh; after all, pensions are not created with the
intent to defraud employees out of their hard-earned money with the
promise of guaranteed investment returns. Public pensions, however, do
have a “consistent theme of understating liabilities, overstating assets, and
pushing costs into the future.”4
For public employees, retirement concerns are mounting in light of the
nationwide public pension crisis, resulting from mismanaged funds and

Copyright 2017, by ALYSSA DEPEW.
1. Ponzi Schemes, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www
.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/P9473PLX]. A Ponzi scheme is an investment scheme in which the operators attract
new investors by promising to generate high returns with little to no risk. The
funds taken from the new investors then are used to pay existing investors,
disguised as high returns. Id.
2. Definitions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans
/plan-participant-employee/definitions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc
/7UXG-2EVL]. A traditional pension plan promises the participant a specified monthly
benefit at retirement. Often, the benefit is based on factors, such as the participant’s
salary, age, and the number of years she worked for the employer. Id.
3. See, e.g., Christopher Carosa, Are Pensions Merely Ponzi Schemes?,
FIDUCIARY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://fiduciarynews.com/2014/08/are-pensionsmerely-ponzi-schemes/ [https://perma.cc/E7AP-ENEX].
4. JOE NATION, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., PENSION MATH: HOW
CALIFORNIA’S RETIREMENT SPENDING IS SQUEEZING THE STATE BUDGET 15 (Dec.
13, 2011), https://www.scribd.com/document/75598848/Pension-Math-How-Califor
nia-s-Retirement-Spending-is-Squeezing-the-State-Budget [https://perma.cc /3NP8LLEG].
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empty promises.5 To date, public pensions nationwide are over $900 billion
short of the amount that governments have promised to their workers in pension
benefits for a given fiscal year.6 Although pension problems transcend state
borders, Louisiana’s pension systems are especially underfunded.7 In a 2016
study, the two largest systems in Louisiana were ranked in the top 25 most
underfunded systems across the United States.8
Public-sector employees in Louisiana, particularly teachers, have limited
retirement plan options when they enter the workforce. Most public employees
are required to pay into a statewide pension plan,9 the two largest being
Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System (“LASERS”) and Teachers’
Retirement System of Louisiana (“TRSL”).10 LASERS and TRSL are
categorized as defined benefit plans, which give the retired employee a fixed
income, usually calculated as a percentage of the employee’s highest earning
salary years.11
5. See JOSHUA D. RAUH, HOOVER INST., HIDDEN DEBT, HIDDEN DEFICITS
1–2 (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/rauh
_debtdeficits_36pp_final_digital_v2revised4-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C9C-HE6
Y]. Most state and local governments provide retirement benefits to their employees
through guaranteed pension programs. The government body contributes taxpayer
money to public systems to fund these promises. Despite states’ optimistic
assumptions about future investment returns, assets in the pension systems will be
insufficient to pay for the pensions of current public employees and retirees and
eventually will have to be supplemented heavily by additional taxpayer dollars to
make up the difference. Id.
6. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE PENSION FUNDING GAP: 2014, at 1
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs
/2016/08/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2014 [https://perma.cc/8EW6-H7KX].
7. REBECCA A. SIELMAN, MILLIMAN, 2016 PUBLIC PENSION FUNDING
STUDY 8–10 (Sept. 2016), http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight
/Periodicals/ppfs/2016-public-pension-funding-study.pdf (analyzing data from
2014 and 2015 for the 100 largest pension programs in the United States)
[https://perma.cc/QN9J-VCT2].
8. Id.
9. Some public employees in Louisiana may choose the Optional Retirement
Plan (“ORP”) instead of selecting TRSL. ORP is a defined contribution plan
administered through private carriers. Optional Retirement Plan (ORP), TEACHERS’
RET. SYS. OF LA., https://www.trsl.org/main/optional_programs/optional_retirement
_plan (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/64G2-VCEW].
10. State Data: Louisiana, PUB. PLANS DATA (2015), http://publicplansdata
.org/quick-facts/by-state/state/?state=LA [https://perma.cc/4ZG2-MEGM].
11. Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit Plan, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/choosing-a-retirement-plan-defined
-benefit-plan (last updated Oct. 20, 2015) [https://perma.cc/R8KU-5NRX];
Retirement Topics – Defined Benefit Plan Benefit Limits, INTERNAL REVENUE
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Public employees in Louisiana lack the option to pay into Social
Security, precluding these employees from receiving the additional
retirement benefits that the federal program provides.12 Although states are
not required to offer public employees the option to pay into Social
Security, Louisiana’s state retirement system for public employees must
provide benefits substantially equivalent to Social Security benefits to
qualify as an alternative to the federal program.13
With some of the most underfunded pension systems in the United
States, Louisiana’s solution to its pension crisis should be a multi-faceted
approach from four angles. First, any efforts to supplement the current
framework with Social Security benefits must be considered carefully
because it is unclear whether public employees participating in Social
Security are in a more advantageous position at retirement than nonparticipants.14 Second, the legislature should enact corrective measures to
restrain political leaders whose underfunding of current pension programs
has caused much of the long-term harm.15 Third, public employers must
modify the current pension structure to mitigate the damage that has been

SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirementtopics-defined-benefit-plan-benefit-limits (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma
.cc/6UJG-MSX2]. For example, if a person’s highest earning wage was $75,000 for
the last few years of her career, then the defined benefit payout would be a percentage
of that amount. Id.
12. TASK FORCE ON STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN BUDGET & TAX POL’Y, LA.
DEP’T. OF REV., LASERS AND TRSL RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 3 (Aug. 12,
2016), http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/Miscellaneous/Budget%20Presentation.ppt
[https://perma.cc/B8XL-TAC4]; see also MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POL’Y INST.,
POLICY MEMORANDUM: NEW LOUISIANA RETIREMENT PLAN IS BAD FOR WORKERS
AND TAXPAYERS 1 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/pm198-louisianaretirement-plan-workers-taxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/VN5Z-BRYE]. Social Security
is funded by contributions that workers make while employed. The funds are used
to pay current beneficiaries of the Social Security program, including Medicare
recipients. Funds take the form of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes
that are withheld from most paychecks. When the worker becomes eligible, she will
receive Social Security benefits that replace a portion of her previous income. SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS (June 2017), https://www.ssa
.gov/pubs /EN-05-10024.pdf [https://perma.cc/V58U-5DRH].
13. LA. STATE EMPS.’ RET. SYS., COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS 2 (Apr. 2011)
(on file with author). Federal law requires public employers to participate in Social
Security unless they can demonstrate that their alternative plans provide benefits
comparable to the benefit provided by Social Security. I.R.C. § 3121(b)(7)(F) (2012).
14. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
15. T. Leigh Anenson, Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
1, 35 (2014).
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done to the system and reduce pension costs.16 Finally, government employers
must provide incentives and make it easier for government employees to save
more on their own for retirement. Strengthening the pension system will
provide economic stability to a state struggling to balance its budget.17
Additionally, because taxpayers ultimately will be required to fund current
retirees’ benefits, stabilizing the pension systems will lessen the burden placed
on taxpayers. Pension directors and lawmakers must be proactive and make
changes now to provide future stability.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on Louisiana’s
current pension system, specifically the role of larger pension programs, such
as LASERS and TRSL. Part I also includes significant historical changes in
the Social Security system and Louisiana’s legislative history regarding both
its state pensions and Social Security. Part II examines the current financial
state of Louisiana’s two largest pension programs: LASERS and TRSL. Part
III introduces an empirical strategy to estimate the differences in retirement
income between individuals affected by their state’s participation in Social
Security. Part IV proposes reform measures and recommendations for
Louisiana’s public pensions and addresses barriers to such reform.
Implementation of these proposals will allow for greater security for
individuals upon retirement and will ease the burden placed on taxpayers.
I. UNDERSTANDING RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
AND LOUISIANA STATE PENSION SYSTEMS
Labor force participants in the United States have several saving
mechanisms available to aid them in preparing for retirement. First, the
majority of employees receive Social Security benefits upon retirement.18
Second, in addition to receiving Social Security, employees may receive a
traditional pension or 401(k) provided by their individual employer.19

16. Id. at 48–49.
17. See Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana’s budget crisis: TOPS will loom over
Legislature’s upcoming session, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 13, 2016, 11:26 AM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/03/legislature_tops_budget_session
.html [https://perma.cc/2F7W-7FQB].
18. Chris Chen, Who is exempt from paying Social Security taxes?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 2016), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/013015
/who-exempt-paying-social-security-taxes.asp [https://perma.cc/9T8P-RSLQ].
19. Retirees receiving both Social Security and a pension are subject to the
Windfall Elimination Provision (“WEP”) and the Government Pension Offset
(“GPO”). In 1983, the WEP was enacted to lower Social Security benefit
payments to beneficiaries “whose work histories include both Social Securitycovered and noncovered employment, with the noncovered employment also
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Third, an employee also may elect to set up commonly used Individual
Retirement Arrangements (“IRAs”).20 This section provides a synopsis of the
current programs available to retirees in Louisiana.
A. The Social Security Act
When Congress passed the Social Security Act (“Act”) in 1935,21 public
employees were not eligible for Social Security benefits,22 primarily because
“there were concerns that imposing a Social Security tax on state and local
government employees might be unconstitutional.”23 In addition to
government employees, about half the workers in the American economy
were excluded from coverage.24
Beginning in 1951, § 218 of the Act allowed states to “opt in” to Social
Security coverage for public employees who were not already covered under

providing pension coverage.” Alan L. Gustman, Thomas L. Steinmeier & Nahid
Tabatabai, The Social Security Windfall Elimination and Government Pension
Offset Provisions for Public Employees in the Health and Retirement Study, 74
SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 55, 55 (2014), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb
/v74n3/v74n3p55.html [https://perma.cc/M3FM-PPXB]. The GPO reduces the
Social Security benefits, including a spouse’s survivor benefits, of an individual
who also is entitled to a government pension based on non-covered employment.
42 U.S.C. § 402(k)(5)(A) (2012); 20 C.F.R. § 404.408a(a) (2016). Both provisions
were enacted to prevent “double-dipping.” Gustman, Steinmeier & Tabatabai,
supra.
20. Traditional and Roth IRAs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 12, 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/traditional-and-roth-iras [https://perma.cc/M
J4Z-TSCX].
21. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620. The purpose
of the Social Security Act was
[t]o provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal
old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more
adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and
crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the
administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a
Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes.
Id.
22. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. v. Shalala, 153 F.3d 1160, 1161 (10th Cir. 1998).
23. Id.
24. The Decision to Exclude Agricultural and Domestic Workers from the 1935
Social Security Act, 70 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 49, 49 (2010), https://www.ssa.gov
/policy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p49.html [https://perma.cc/YKR2-7RQ5].
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a retirement plan.25 This “opt-in” is referred to as a “Section 218 Agreement”
and is entered into with the Social Security Administration.26 Once a coverage
group enters and is provided coverage through such an agreement, the contract
cannot be terminated.27 On July 2, 1991, Social Security participation became
mandatory for state employees who were not members of a public retirement
system.28 To date, Louisiana is one of 15 states in which teachers have not
opted into Social Security by way of Section 218 Agreements.29
For public employers to remain opted out of providing Social Security
benefits to their employees, the state must offer a retirement program that
qualifies as an alternative to Social Security by providing retirement benefits
“substantially equivalent” to the retirement portion of Social Security.”30
Federal law primarily governs Social Security decisions and permits Louisiana
to implement such a scheme under § 218 of the Social Security Act.31 Louisiana
entered into a Section 218 Agreement with the Social Security Administration
in 1952 but only for certain state and local government employees.32 According
to § 218, states can amend their agreements to extend Social Security coverage
to any employees to whom the agreements did not apply previously,

25. 42 U.S.C. § 418(d)(5)(A) (2012) (showing that although most public
employees were allowed to opt in, the 1954 amendment still excluded police
officers and firefighters from Social Security).
26. Social Security, LA. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., https://www.treasury.state
.la.us/Home%20Pages/SocialSecurity.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://per
ma.cc/JBY5-SDBP].
27. See § 418(f); see also Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec.
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1981).
28. Program Operations Manual System: RS 01505.001 Introduction to
Section 218 and State and Local Coverage, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0301505001 [https://perma.cc/SRS4-REC4].
29. Social Security Offsets: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N,
http://www.nea.org/home/16819.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/U
W2V-R697]. Other states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Kentucky, Texas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, and Ohio. Id.
30. Mallory Chatelain, Same-Sex Marriages Are Not Created Equal: United
States v. Windsor and Its Legal Aftermath in Louisiana, 75 LA. L. REV. 303, 306
(2014); see also COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 2; 26 C.F.R. §
31.3121(b)(7)–2 (2000).
31. § 418; Program Operations Manual System SL 20001.210: Determinations
Regarding Section 218 Agreements, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Dec. 11, 2003), http://policy
.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1920001210 [https://perma.cc/AY79-TJAJ].
32. See Social Security, supra note 26.
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regardless of whether these employees were previously members of a
public retirement system, such as LASERS.33
B. Louisiana’s Public Pension Systems
Louisiana has 19 pension programs for public employees34—the two
largest of which are LASERS and TRSL. Established in 1946, LASERS
has a mandatory membership requirement for most Louisiana state
employees.35 Additionally, because LASERS previously qualified as a
substitute to the Social Security program, members of LASERS are not
eligible to receive Social Security benefits.36
TRSL was founded in 1936 and is Louisiana’s largest public retirement
system, providing services and benefits to more than 160,000 individuals.37
TRSL is qualified under the Internal Revenue Code as a public trust fund,38
which is meant to provide retirement benefits for its members.39 All
teachers in Louisiana must become members of this system as a condition
of their employment.40
Both LASERS and TRSL are categorized as defined benefit plans, as
opposed to defined contribution plans. A distinguishing characteristic of a
defined benefit plan is that the employer bears the risk and responsibility
“to make sufficient contributions to the plan to insure that the benefits the
33. § 418(a)(1), (c)(4). “The Commissioner of Social Security shall, at the request
of any State, enter into an agreement with such State for the purpose of extending the
insurance system established by this subchapter to services performed by individuals
as employees of such State or any political subdivision thereof.” § 418(a)(1).
34. Member Systems, LA. ASS’N OF PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., http://www
.lapers.org/MemberSystems.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc
/Y5XU-7H5F].
35. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 2; Introduction to Section
218: State and Local Coverage, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. Slide 16 (2008), www.ssa.gov
/section218training/documents/Resource_3.ppt [https://perma.cc/WN9B-59DS].
36. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 2; Social Security
Impact, LA. STATE EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., https://lasersonline.org/resources
/legislative-issues/2017-regular-session-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F52L-F8MM].
37. About TRSL, TEACHERS’ RET. SYS. OF LA., https://www.trsl.org/main
/about_trsl (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/X3NW-NMUY].
38. Also known as a “charitable trust,” a public trust fund is a fund of money
whose principal and interest monies are available for the benefit of the general
public rather than a private individual or entity. Public Trust Fund, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
39. About TRSL, supra note 37.
40. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:721 (2017).
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employee is entitled to receive . . . at retirement will be paid.”41 Further,
under defined benefit plans, a qualified plan trustee makes the investment
decisions.42
Contrary to defined benefit, under a defined contribution plan, the
employee is not entitled to a particular payout at retirement.43 The amount
of benefits that the employee will receive at retirement is based upon the
amount of contributions the employer and employee make to the plan and the
interest earned on those contributions.44 The burden is on the employee—not
the employer—to direct his investments in certain mutual funds.45
Most public pensions are run by a board of trustees—TRSL and LASERS
are no exception. A 13-member Board of Trustees administers LASERS
operations.46 Louisiana law permits the board to adopt rules and regulations
in administering LASERS programs and benefits.47 Similarly, the TRSL
Board of Trustees is made up of 12 elected members and 5 ex officio members
and is responsible for safeguarding and managing the assets held in trust to
provide retirement income for system members.48
Together, TRSL and LASERS have approximately 260,000 members49
and account for over 70% of public retirement members.50 Because these
two systems are so large, their fiscal decisions have a significant impact not
only on a large portion of public employees and retirees but also on the
state economy as a whole.51

41. DENNIS R. LASSILA & BOB G. KILPATRICK, EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION
BENEFITS TAX GUIDE ¶ 502.2 (2016); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 453 (2004).
42. LASSILA & KILPATRICK, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Board of Trustees, LA. STATE EMPS’ RET. SYS., https://lasersonline
.org/about/board-of-trustees/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SQ6E2R7J].
47. Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 11:515(2).
48. TRSL Board of Trustees, TEACHERS’ RET. SYS. OF LA., https://www.trsl
.org/main/about_trsl/board_of_trustees (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://per
ma.cc/TKP8-5WHG].
49. About TRSL, supra note 37; About LASERS, LA. STATE EMPS. RET. SYS.,
http://www.lasersonline.org/about (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma
.cc/M8QQ-PUHZ].
50. Member Systems, supra note 34.
51. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 5, 17. Because “[o]ver
90% of LASERS retirees live in Louisiana,” the retirement system’s economic
impact amounts to $782 million. Id. Additionally, “LASERS invests over $230
AND
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II. THE DIRE FINANCIAL STATE OF LOUISIANA’S TWO LARGEST PENSION
PROGRAMS: LASERS AND TRSL
The Louisiana Legislature consolidated public retirement law in the
Louisiana Revised Statutes to comply with the requirement in the
Louisiana Constitution “to maintain public retirement systems on a sound
actuarial basis.”52 Despite this effort by the legislature, Louisiana’s largest
pension systems still are severely underfunded compared to other
comparable programs.53 The LASERS actuarial report, published on June
30, 2016, declared that its pension program has over $6.9 billion in
unfunded actuarial accrued liability (“UAAL”).54 Similarly, TRSL had
more than $11 billion in UAAL for the 2015 fiscal year.55 In its basic form,
UAAL is the difference between the amount in benefits that a pension has
committed to pay in the future and the total amount of assets currently on
hand.56
Determining whether a pension plan has become underfunded is based
on the actuarial valuation of that plan. The Louisiana Constitution requires
“that the legislature establish for each state or statewide public retirement
system[] a particular method of actuarial valuation . . . .”57 For both
LASERS and TRSL, the “‘funded percentage’ for each state public
retirement system” is the amount of assets available divided by the liability
of the system for future payouts.58

million in Louisiana companies.” Id. LASERS is a “major economic driver” for
the state of Louisiana. Id.
52. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:2.
53. See SIELMAN, supra note 7.
54. Summary of Valuation Results: LASERS Actuarial Valuation, FOSTER &
FOSTER ACTUARIES AND CONSULTANTS (June 30, 2016), http://lasersonline.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ValuationSummarySheet-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B
NP7-FWGA].
55. TEACHERS RET. SYS. OF LA., 2015 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REPORT 110 (2015), https://www.trsl.org/uploads/File/Annual%20Reports/CA
FR/2015_CAFR_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/X494-W5BM] [hereinafter TRSL
ANNUAL REPORT].
56. See Anna K. Selby, Pensions In A Pinch: Why Texas Should Reconsider
Its Policies On Public Retirement Benefit Protection, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211,
1216 (2011).
57. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(E)(1); see also LA. REV. STAT. § 11:21.
58. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:23. For both LASERS and TRSL, the “funded
percentage for each state public retirement system shall mean the valuation assets
used to determine the actuarially required contributions pursuant to [Louisiana
Revised Statutes §] 11:102 divided by the accrued liability of the system
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The presence of unfunded accrued liabilities in the actuarial equation
is not in and of itself problematic with the constitutional requirement that
the public retirement systems maintain actuarial soundness.59 The unfunded
accrued liability is just one factor “in the multi-level formula for determining
actuarial soundness of the system.”60 To evaluate the strength of a pension
program, industry-leading financial researchers measure the percentage of
total commitments a pension has made that are funded.61 Researchers assign
a “below average” rating for pensions that are 60% to 80% funded and a
“weak” rating for pensions that are funded below 60%.62 With LASERS and
TRSL funded at 62.75% and 62.5% in 2016, respectively, these two large
systems are approaching the weakest financial rating available for public
pension programs.63 If Louisiana faces a financial crisis and is forced to make
cuts to expenditures and pension benefits, then devastating financial
consequences could impact the stability of public employees’ pensions.
The exorbitant amount of UAAL, combined with low actuarial ratings,
clearly indicates that there is insufficient revenue and over-spending—or,
more likely, a combination of both—plaguing Louisiana’s largest pension
systems.64 This underfunding causes instability for Louisiana’s economy,
particularly because the law, regardless of the availability of funds,

determined by utilizing the funding method established in [Louisiana Revised
Statutes §] 11:22.” Id.
59. Following accounting standards for state and local government sponsored pension plans, the term “actuarial soundness” references plans that
have a logical pattern of funding that is anticipated to accumulate sufficient assets
to make pension payments when they come due—a period that can extend many
years into the future and even after an employee stops working. AM. ACAD. OF
ACTUARIES, ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS 13 (2012), http://www.actuary.org/files
/publications/Actuarial%20Soundness%20Special%20Report%20FINAL%205
%2010%2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNV2-BL6P].
60. La. Mun. Ass’n v. State, 893 So. 2d 809, 855 (La. 2005).
61. STANDARD & POOR’S, U.S. STATE RATINGS METHODOLOGY 19 (Jan. 3,
2011), http://www.nasra.org/Files/Topical%20Reports/Credit%20Effects/StateRat
ingsMethodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS77-8DN5].
62. Id. Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings provide high-quality market
intelligence in the form of credit ratings, research, and thought leadership. Id.
63. SIELMAN, supra note 7.
64. Over-spending could include the state borrowing from pension funds to
pay other debts, giving benefit increases to members, or making COLAs. See
generally Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV.
3, 34 (2013). For more information on COLAs, see infra note 121.
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guarantees pension benefits.65 Further negative consequences of an
insolvent pension system include the inability to pay future commitments,
workers not being paid for retirement, and taxpayers bearing the burden to
fulfill the promised funding.66
III. SOCIAL SECURITY PERKS: ARE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN LOUISIANA
MISSING OUT?
Although public-sector employees in Louisiana have not opted into
the Social Security program for the last 60 years, this delay does not
prevent particular groups of employees67 from opting in at any point in the
future.68 Some scholars argue that Social Security benefits could provide
a “safety net” to public employees by preventing gaps in coverage.69 This
part provides the steps that Louisiana could take to opt-in to Social
Security, the expected consequences, and an empirical analysis of the
impact that the lack of Social Security has had on both Louisiana’s public
school teachers and public school teachers nationwide.70 This study is the
first in Louisiana to evaluate the long-term effects of the decision made
over the last several decades to abscond from Social Security benefits for
public employees.
A. How Could Louisiana “Opt-in” to Social Security, and What Would
the Consequences Be?
Louisiana could form an agreement with the Social Security
Administration if the governor of Louisiana certified to the Commissioner

65. “The accrued benefits of members of any state or statewide public retirement
system shall not be diminished or impaired.” LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(E)(5). The
promised pension benefits have to be paid regardless of the availability of funds. Id.
66. Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations Of The
Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 89–90 (2011).
67. For example, an entire school district could vote by referendum to opt in
to Social Security by following the steps laid out in Part III.A. of this Comment.
68. See discussion infra Part III.A.
69. Anenson, supra note 15, at 57; see also DAWN NUSCHLER ET AL., CONG.
RES. SERVICE, R41936, SOCIAL SECURITY: MANDATORY COVERAGE OF NEW
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 3 (July 25, 2011), http://www.nasra
.org/Files/Topical%20Reports/Social%20Security/CRS%202011%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HR6A-FEXG].
70. Public school teachers make up a large portion of public pension
employees in Louisiana and therefore provide a significant test group for this
empirical study. TRSL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 37.
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of Social Security that the following five conditions have been met.71 First, a
referendum by secret written ballot must be held to consider whether the
particular pension group in question should be covered under a Section 218
Agreement.72 Second, the opportunity to vote in the referendum can be
given only to eligible employees.73 Third, all employees who are eligible
to vote must receive at least 90 days’ notice of the referendum.74 Fourth,
the referendum should be directed under the supervision of the governor
or an entity designated by him.75 Lastly, a majority of the eligible
employees must participate in the vote for the decision to be effective.76
There are several immediate consequences that would result from
Louisiana’s public employees entering a Section 218 Agreement. These
consequences are evidenced in the increased contributions from teachers’
annual salaries. If an agreement opting into Social Security were executed,
teachers would be required to contribute an additional 6.2% of the first
$118,500 of their annual salaries to federal income tax.77 Adding this
amount to pension contributions already made by teachers would cause
teachers’ total contributions to rise to nearly 15%.78 Further, the school
districts, which under a non-Social Security framework pay nothing into
Social Security, would have to match employee contributions with an
additional 6.2% in payroll tax.79 These immediate effects would put a large
strain on both school systems and individual teachers, particularly after
recent years of budget cuts.80
71. 42 U.S.C. § 418(d)(3) (2012). The governor also could designate another
official to certify that the conditions have been met. Id.
72. § 418(d)(3)(A).
73. § 418(d)(3)(B). An employee is deemed an “eligible employee” for
purposes of a referendum if, at the time the referendum was held, the employee
was in a position covered by the retirement system and was a member of such
system. § 418(d)(3)(E). The exception to this definition includes an employee
whose position to which the state agreement does not apply and is covered by a
different retirement system. § 418(d)(5)(B).
74. § 418(d)(3)(C).
75. § 418(d)(3)(D).
76. § 418(d)(3)(E).
77. JUDITH S. LOHMAN, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: TEACHERS AND SOCIAL
SECURITY (2006), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0547.htm (analyzing
the direct consequences if teachers in Connecticut were to opt into Social Security)
[https://perma.cc/6FBA-EXYN].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Julia O’Donoghue, Latest Louisiana Budget Cuts K-12 Funding, Protects
Higher Ed, T IMES-PICAYUNE (June 22, 2016, 5:41 PM), http://www.nola.com
/politics/index.ssf/2016/06/budget_public_schools_cut.html [https://per
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In addition to the short-term financial stress that this option would put
on public employers and employees, Social Security may not actually
provide any long-term stability for new members. Demands on the Social
Security Administration have reached all-time highs in recent years as a
result of the “baby boom generation” reaching its peak years for
retirement.81 The negative financial outlook attached to the Social Security
program is further emphasized by the 2016 Trustees Report on Social
Security’s Financial Outlook,82 which reported that the program faces
critical deficits.83 Because the Social Security program is so strained, it
likely would not provide enough future benefit to Louisiana state
employees to make opting in worthwhile.84
ma.cc/7SMH-FU7Q]. See generally Joseph Rallo, Letters: Cuts to Higher
Education Harming the Future of Louisiana, ADVOCATE (July 7, 2016, 3:15 AM),
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/opinion/letters/article_064d2bea-43ac11e6-abf1-e3246d5fdb6c.html [https://per ma. cc/4R5S -EF3A].
81. KATHLEEN ROMIG, CTR. ON BUDGET AND P OL’Y PRIORITIES, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION CUTS HURT EVERY STATE 1 (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www
.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-administration-cuts-hurt-everystate [https://perma.cc/K42B-AAJ4].
82. The Trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds publish an
annual report on the current and projected financial status of the two programs. Both
programs face long-term financing shortfalls under the current scheduled benefits
and funding, and lawmakers have a broad range of policies that, if implemented,
could reduce the deficiencies of both programs. The Trustees’ Report recommends
the urgency with which lawmakers should address these shortfalls and implement
timely solutions. This recommendation is important because early action by elected
officials can minimize negative impacts on vulnerable populations, including lowerincome workers, and people already dependent on program benefits. Status of the
Social Security and Medicare Programs, SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ [https://perma.cc/4NXL-DG9H].
83. ALICA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C., SOCIAL SECURITY’S
FINANCIAL OUTLOOK: THE 2016 UPDATE IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (June 2016),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IB_16-10.pdf (stating a 75 year
deficit of 2.66% of taxable payrolls) [https://perma.cc/X5V4-26T9].
84. Social Security’s main program, Old-age and Survivors Insurance
(“OASI”), is projected to reach insolvency in 2035. The program
is expected to have only enough revenue from payroll taxes, interest on
the Trust Fund balance, and repayment of borrowed Trust Fund dollars
to pay out scheduled benefits until 2035 . . . If no action is taken to
improve Social Security’s solvency before its Trust Fund runs dry,
benefits will either be delayed or reduced across the board by 23 percent.
ROMINA BOCCIA, HERITAGE FOUND., SOCIAL SECURITY: $39 BILLION DEFICIT IN
2014, INSOLVENT BY 2035, at 22 (July 29, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research
/reports/2015/07/social-security-39-billion-deficit-in-2014-insolvent-by-2035
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Further, providing Social Security as an option for public employees
could have a negative impact on Louisiana’s current pension programs.
For example, if Louisiana implemented a scheme to make LASERS
optional rather than mandatory for all state employees, the state may face
substantial consolidation concerns. Specifically, allowing Louisiana’s
employees to have the option between LASERS and Social Security would
pose a threat to its viability as an independent retirement system because
it would not be able to attract new members at the same rate as it had
previously.85 Although new employees still may choose to join LASERS,
many others may choose to go with Social Security, thus diminishing the
pool of participants who would be paying into LASERS.
If the number of participants in LASERS starts to diminish, this could
prompt lawmakers to consolidate LASERS with other state retirement
plans to create a larger public pension system.86 Therefore, though it may
be in the best interest of an individual LASERS member to supplement
with or switch over to Social Security, it would weaken LASERS severely
as a whole if the program starts losing participants faster than they can be
replaced. Because LASERS is a “major economic driver” for the state,87
Louisiana has a considerable public interest in protecting LASERS by
declining proposals that would encourage LASERS members to participate in
other benefit plans, such as Social Security.88
Further, teachers in Louisiana, who make up the largest public pension
group in the state, are relatively better off at retirement than their counterparts
in states who are paying into Social Security.89 The following section
introduces an empirical strategy to estimate the difference in retirement
income between individuals who reside in states that have entered into a
Section 218 Agreement, compared to those individuals who do not. This
comparison attempts to isolate the financial consequences of paying into
Social Security.

[https://perma.cc/XS4D-XUXJ].
85. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 6, 7.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 5, 17. Because “[o]ver 90% of LASERS retirees live in Louisiana,”
the retirement system’s economic impact amounts to $782 million. Additionally,
“LASERS invests over $230 million in Louisiana companies.” Id.
88. Id. at 17.
89. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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B. Empirical Strategy and Data Analysis
This empirical strategy uses data from the American Community
Survey (“ACS”), which was collected from 2009 to 2014.90 The ACS is a
nationally representative survey conducted by the United States Census
Bureau.91 It is the largest administered survey in the United States and is
sent to approximately 3.5 million individuals each year.92 The ACS is a
commonly used data source and is conducted to facilitate economic
research in the United States.93 It provides a wide array of information for
each person surveyed, including demographic characteristics and income
measures.94
1. An Introduction to the Difference-in-Difference Framework
The empirical strategy used in this study employs a difference-indifference estimation framework that has become widely popular in
economic and legal research.95 The difference-in-difference estimation
strategy isolates the difference between the outcomes of two groups from
simultaneous effects that may influence the same outcome. 96 Particularly,
90. Steven Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version
6.0, MINNEAPOLIS: UNIV. OF MINN. (2015), http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0
[https://perma.cc/A7N2-5GFF].
91. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY INFORMATION
GUIDE 1 (Apr. 2013), https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/acs-informationguide/flipbook/files/inc/d6425564bc.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQH6-7LPY].
92. Id. at 8, 13.
93. American Community Survey (ACS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about.html [https://perma .cc/9MW6J239]. In addition to facilitating academic research, the ACS provides a wealth of data
that is relied on by government agencies to make important decisions about the
distribution of nearly $400 billion in federal funds each year. REGINA POWERS, DAVID
BEEDE & RUDY TELLES, JR., ECONS. AND STATS. ADMIN., THE VALUE OF THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: SMART GOVERNMENT, COMPETITIVE BUSINESS,
AND INFORMED CITIZENS 1 (Apr. 2015), http://www.esa.gov/sites/default/files/thevalue-of-the-acs.pdf [https://perma.cc /62RF-EGCF].
94. American Community Survey (ACS), supra note 93.
95. See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The
America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 521 (Mar.
2013) (citing JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 450–54 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the use and implementation
of the difference-in-difference approach in analyzing policy)); see also David S.
Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and
Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 1613, 1619 (2009).
96. See supra note 95.
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the average annual retirement income of teachers in a state without a
Section 218 Agreement—a non-Section 218 state—is compared to the
average annual retirement income of retired teachers in a state with a
Section 218 Agreement—a Section 218 state. This analysis focuses on
public employees who are teachers because they comprise the largest
pension group in Louisiana.97
Any difference observed in the average annual retirement income of
these two groups could be the result of retired teachers in non-Section 218
states not receiving Social Security income. The difference, however,
could instead be the result of fundamental differences between states that
chose to enter or not enter a Section 218 Agreement. Specifically, any
difference in annual retirement income of retired teachers between
Louisiana and Alabama may be caused by other economic factors and not
the state’s decision to enter a Section 218 Agreement.
To avoid this dual effect, the average annual income of retired nonteachers in a non-Section 218 state is compared to the average annual
income of retired non-teachers in a Section 218 state.98 These non-teachers
likely worked in private sector jobs and, therefore, are not affected by their
state’s Section 218 Agreement status. Therefore, the difference in their
average annual retirement incomes represents the general difference
between non-Section 218 and Section 218 states. The dissimilarities across
the two types of states could be caused by contemporaneous factors, such
as state-specific economics, rather than the state’s decision to enter a
Section 218 Agreement.
The difference in means between the retired teachers across the two
types of states then is compared to the difference in means from the retired
non-teachers across the two types of states.99 The difference in these
97. The ACS data provides information indicating an individual’s undergraduate
degree. The individuals used for this analysis all have an undergraduate education
degree. Although some may not be using their education degree to teach, the
assumption made for this study is that those with an education degree are likely
employed as teachers. American Community Survey (ACS), supra note 93.
98. Giorgo Sertsios, Bonding Through Investments: Evidence from Franchising,
31 J. OF LAW, ECON. & ORG. 187, 200 (2015) (using a difference-in-difference
approach to analyze the impact of good-cause laws on investment requirements). “A
key assumption in a difference-in-difference estimation is that the variation in the
variable of interest attributed to the treatment[—that is, not having a Section 218
agreement—]is not a mere consequence of prior trends.” Id.
99. In its basic function, the difference-in-difference approach “contains a
treatment sample and a control sample.” Mark Humphery-Jenner, Strong
Financial Laws Without Strong Enforcement: Is Good Law Always Better than
No Law?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 288, 299 (2013). “The treatment sample
is exposed to the treatment in the second period but not in the first, [and] [t]he
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amounts is known as a difference-in-difference estimate.100 This estimate
represents the additional annual retirement income that retired teachers
have in non-Section 218 states, relative to Section 218 states, after
conditioning out contemporaneous effects caused by systematic
differences between the two types of states.
C. Application of the Difference-in-Difference Estimation Strategy
The difference-in-difference estimation strategy is applied through
two levels of analysis, which helps postulate the most robust results.101 The
first level provides a direct comparison between Louisiana and Alabama—
two states similar in median income, labor force participation, geography,
and demographics.102 The second level of analysis increases the number
of observations used by comparing all non-Section 218 states to all Section
218 states.
1. Louisiana vs. Alabama
The first level of analysis applies the difference-in-difference
estimation strategy to compare the retirement income of Louisiana
residents, who are ostensibly affected by their state’s choice not to enter
into a Section 218 Agreement, with similar individuals in Alabama, who
control sample is never exposed to the treatment.” Id. In the study at hand, the
difference-in-difference model uses the control sample to adjust for changes in
retirement income that are not related to outside factors.
100. J. D. ANGRIST & J. S. PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN
EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 227–43 (2008). The difference-in-difference technique
is “a statistical technique used in econometrics and quantitative research in the
social sciences that attempts to mimic an experimental research design using
observational study data, by studying the differential effect of a treatment on a
‘treatment group’ versus a ‘control group’ in a natural experiment.” Id.
101. See Michael Lechner, The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-inDifference Methods, 4 FOUNDS. AND TRENDS IN ECONOMETRICS 165, 168 (2011).
As Lechner explains,
The basic idea of this identification strategy is that if the two treated and
the two nontreated groups are subject to the same time trends, and if the
treatment has had no effect in the pre-treatment period, then an estimate
of the “effect” of the treatment in a period in which it is known to have
none, can be used to remove the effect of confounding factors to which
a comparison of post-treatment outcomes of treated and nontreated may
be subject to.
Id.
102. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
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have received Social Security income because of their state’s decision to
enter into a Section 218 Agreement. Alabama is a natural control state for
Louisiana because both states are in the southern region of the United
States and have similar observable characteristics. For example, the
median income of employed individuals in Louisiana is $34,000, and the
median income for comparable individuals in Alabama is $32,000.103
Further, these two states have similar labor force participation rates: 57.1%
in Louisiana and 54.4% in Alabama.104 Likewise, the level of education
attained is similar in both states. In Louisiana, 84.6% of individuals ages
24 and older have a high school degree, and in Alabama, 85.3% of
individuals ages 24 and older have a high school degree.105
Table 1 shows the mean retirement income for individuals 67 and over
who are no longer participating in the labor force.106 The income measures
were adjusted for inflation by being converted into 2014 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index (“CPI”).107 The first column reports the mean and
standard deviation of retirement income for retirees in Louisiana and
Alabama who have a teaching degree. As displayed in the table, retired
teachers in Louisiana have $394.76 less in annual retirement income than
teachers in Alabama.108

103. Statistics from 2009-2014 ACS data. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY
INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 91, at 8 (calculations on file with author). See
supra Part III.B.1. for an explanation of these calculations.
104. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 91, at 8.
105. Id.
106. See infra Table 1.
107. Consumer Price Index 1913-, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS,
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community/teaching-aids/cpi-calculator-informa
tion/consumer-price-index-and-inflation-rates-1913 (last visited Sept. 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/XU89-5CF8]. The CPI is a measure of the average change in
prices over time in a market basket of goods and services. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics releases CPI data monthly. Consumer Price Index, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATS., https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma
.cc/3NBS-2DMN].
108. See infra Table 1.
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Table 1: Louisiana and Alabama Mean Annual Retirement
Income and Difference-in-Difference Estimates

Louisiana

Number of Observations

Alabama

Number of Observations

Difference in Louisiana and
Alabama

Difference-in-Difference

School Teachers

Non-School Teachers

17113.38

15776.48

(20276.18)

(24743.43)

1,697

2,758

17508.14

22230.66

(21734.36)

(31110.56)

1,747

3,613

-394.76

-6454.18***

[-0.55]

[-8.95]

6059.42***
[5.46]

Data comes from the 2014 American Community Survey. Standard deviations are
reported in parentheses. Test statistics (t-stats) from difference in means tests are reported
in square brackets. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and *** 0.01 denote significance levels from the
difference in means tests.

The initial comparison demonstrated in the first column of Table 1
does not reveal whether the lower retirement income of Louisiana teachers
is caused by Louisiana teachers not participating in Social Security through
a Section 218 Agreement or if retired individuals in Louisiana generally
have a lower retirement income relative to retired individuals in Alabama.
To account for general differences in retirement income between the two
states, the mean retirement income of non-teachers109 is reported in the
second column of Table 1.110 As displayed, individuals in Louisiana have a
retirement income that, on average, is $6,454.18 lower than individuals in
109. It may be the case that teachers who have not filed Section 218
agreements receive Social Security income through other jobs they have
participated in that were not teaching jobs in Louisiana. Similarly, individuals
who are non-teachers may not receive Social Security income due to unknown
variables.
110. See supra Table 1.
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Alabama. The difference-in-difference estimate is calculated by subtracting
the difference in retirement income of non-teachers between the two states
from the difference in retirement income of teachers between the two
states.
The difference-in-difference estimate suggests that retired Louisiana
teachers have $6,059.42 more in retirement income because they have not
opted into Social Security.111 The disparity of non-teacher salaries across
Louisiana and Alabama suggests that Louisiana teachers may have been
at a disadvantage if they had opted into Social Security. In the next
subsection, this study is followed up by a more robust study of retirement
income in the two types of states.
2. Teachers in Non-Section 218 States vs. Teachers in Section 218
States
The second level of analysis expands upon the first by considering
retirement income in all states in the United States. More specifically, it
compares the mean retirement income of teachers in non-Section 218
states to that of teachers in Section 218 states. The difference in retirement
income between those two groups then is subtracted by the difference in
retirement income of non-teachers in non-Section 218 states and nonteachers in Section 218 states. This second difference, calculated from
non-teachers in the two types of states, factors out any contemporaneous
effects in retirement income that may be triggered by other economic or
social characteristics of a state.
Table 2 presents the results from the second analysis. As displayed,
the difference-in-difference estimate shows that the annual retirement
income of teachers in non-Section 218 states that do not participate in
Social Security is $2,005.86 more than teachers in Section 218 states that
participate in Social Security, after conditioning out general differences in
retirement incomes in these two types of states.112

111. See supra Table 1.
112. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Non-Section 218 and Section 218 Agreement States Mean
Annual Retirement Income and Difference-in-Difference Estimates

Non-Section 218 Agreement States

Number of Observations
Section 218 Agreement States

Number of Observations

Difference in Section 218 Agreement
States

Difference-in-Difference

School Teachers

Non-School
Teachers

19310.16

17911.90

(25698.63)

(29217.70)

42,217

119,666

16938.12

17545.71

(22445.59)

(27697.79)

68,415

168,213

2372.04***

366.19***

[16.14]

[3.42]
2005.86***
[10.19]

Data comes from the 2014 American Community Survey. Standard deviations are
reported in parentheses. Test statistics (“t-stats”) from difference in means tests are
reported in square brackets. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and *** 0.01 denote significance levels from
the difference in means tests.

Although the difference-in-difference estimate is lower when
comparing all non-Section 218 states and Section 218 states instead of
comparing just Louisiana and Alabama, the amount is still significant. At
a minimum it indicates that Louisiana teachers—and teachers in other nonSection 218 states—certainly have not been negatively impacted by not
opting in to Social Security. Indeed, the estimate in Table 2 implies that
teachers who do not participate in Social Security have more income at
retirement than teachers who do.
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IV. REFORM MEASURES FOR LOUISIANA AND OTHER
NON-SECTION 218 STATES
As a result of the Great Recession,113 nearly every state took steps to
improve the financial condition of its pension plans.114 As one of the states
with large and severely underfunded public pensions, Louisiana must
continue to remedy the problem through three affirmative approaches.
First, the existing pension plans should be modified to require the balance
of in-flow and out-flow of funds and move toward replacement of defined
benefit with defined contribution plans. Second, moral hazard must be
minimized through lawmakers and taxpayers. Third, federal and local
lawmakers need to incentivize public employees to maximize their current
savings plans.
A. Strategies to Modify Existing Pension Structures
To create a more stable retirement income for public employees,
modifications should be made to Louisiana’s existing state pension
programs, specifically LASERS and TRSL. The state legislature and each
pension fund board of trustees should take initiatives to bring about
changes to current pension structures. These changes need to focus on
restricting income increases to retirees unless there has been an increase
of revenue to the pension funds, strengthening the reliability of the pension
funds through defined contribution plans, and encouraging the provision
of diverse programs for retirement savings. Although attempts have been
made to strengthen existing pension plans, more must be done.115
113. The Great Recession was the longest recession since World War II,
spanning from December 2007 to June 2009. Its duration and effects were severe.
For example, real gross domestic product (“GDP”) fell 4.3%, the largest decline
in the postwar era. The unemployment rate, which was five percent in December
2007, rose until it peaked at ten percent in October 2009. Additionally, home
prices fell approximately 30%. Robert Rich, The Great Recession of 2007-09,
FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org
/Events/DetailView/58 [https://perma.cc/C6H9-3ENB]; see also CHRISTIANO
EICHENBAUM TRABANDT, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., No.
1107r, UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT RECESSION (Aug. 2014), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2014/files/ifdp1107.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XAC-3
8N6].
114. See Tyler Bond, The Great Recession and Public Pensions, NAT’L PUB.
PENSION COAL. (July 11, 2016), https://protectpensions.org/2016/07/11/greatrecession-public-pensions/ [https://perma.cc/W8YK-3V8J].
115. Mark Ballard, Louisiana Legislators Want to Increase Monthly Pension
Checks For State Retirees, ADVOCATE (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:47 PM), http://www.the
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1. Make Money Before Spending Money
Louisiana’s pensions are some of the most severely underfunded in the
country, yet Louisiana’s pensions continue to pay more money to retirees
than pensions of other states.116 These facts indicate that the pensions are
expending more money than what they are earning in revenue. Recent
legislation regarding pension payouts provides an example of how this
problem occurs.
The Louisiana Legislature recently passed117 Senator Barrow Peacock’s
proposed Senate Bill 2 (“Peacock’s Senate Bill”), in which pensioners over
the age of 60 who have been retired for at least a year and are drawing checks
from one of the four state systems would receive a 1.5% increase in
payments for state workers and teachers; a 1.8% increase for public school
employees; and a 2% increase for state police.118 Peacock’s bill proposed
the first increase in benefits in two years.119 The funds to pay for this
increase are not supposed to come from the state general fund but from the
“Experience Account” fund, which collects excess investment dollars.120
The money in this account legally cannot be used to pay for anything but
Cost of Living Adjustments (“COLAs”),121 although portions are
supposed to be used for paying down part of the billions of dollars in
retirement system debt.122
Although on the surface this senate bill appears to have adhered to the
standard of only increasing payouts when there has been an increase in
revenue, it is difficult to conclude that the money from excess investment
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_aab379fd-55e1-53af-b
a91-520757c0b3b0.html [https://perma.cc/H5LJ-LW7T].
116. See SIELMAN, supra note 7.
117. Peacock’s Senate Bill went into effect on May 19, 2016. S.B. 2, 2016 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2016).
118. Id.; see also Ballard, supra note 115.
119. Ballard, supra note 115.
120. Id.
121. COLAs are general benefit increases given to a savings program that are
based on increases to the cost of living, as measured by the Consumer Price Index.
Cost-Of-Living Adjustment (COLA), SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2017), https:
//www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/colasummary.html [https://perma.cc/A54K-N2T
P]. The Consumer Price Index is an aggregate of the prices of a relatively fixed
“basket of goods,” which reflects price changes associated with the cost of living,
and is published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Consumer Price Index,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ [https://per
ma.cc/VFA9-LN8Q]. COLAs are often made to state-run pensions and to Social
Security. Id.
122. Ballard, supra note 115.
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dollars is truly revenue. The obvious concern is that because this revenue
is not consistent—as the revenue from a tax increase would be—it is not a
stable source of funding to justify this increase in COLAs. Further, there
is an additional concern that in a down year in the stock market, the
“Experience Account” will not accrue enough excess revenue to pay for
the promised COLAs, leaving taxpayers to make up the difference.123
Peacock’s senate bill provides just one example of how politicians
increase payouts without first building up a base of funds to pay for
them.124
2. Let’s Swap: Defined Benefit for Defined Contribution
Louisiana pension programs such as LASERS and TRSL would benefit
from transitioning from a defined benefit to defined contribution125 structure,
primarily because defined contribution plans have the “distinct advantage” of
“contribution stability.”126 Defined benefit plans are vulnerable to
contribution unpredictability because of changing market and demographic
conditions, but defined contribution plans do not have the same sensitivity to
market changes.127 Although the defined contribution structure at one time
seemed to be a “radical departure from the status quo,” defined contribution
plans have become the primary framework for retirement savings.128
Although positive benefits exist from implementing a defined
contribution structure, the switch from defined benefit to defined contribution
comes with transition costs.129 Recent research shows that the type of
123. Id.
124. John C. Goodman, Detroit is a Dying Example of How All Ponzi Schemes
End, FORBES (July 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2013
/07/25/detroit-is-a-dying-example-of-how-all-ponzi-schemes-end/#2c93629211f0
(describing the city of Detroit’s pension default) [https://perma.cc/LVS7-DH8E].
125. A defined contribution plan is “a plan which provides for an individual
account for each participant and for benefits based solely on the amount
contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be
allocated to such participant’s account.” I.R.C. § 414(i) (2012).
126. N AT ’ L C ONF . ON P UB . E MP . R ET . S YS ., W HAT IS THE C OST OF
TRANSITIONING FROM A DB PLAN TO A DC PLAN? 9 (Apr. 2015), http://www
.ncpers.org/files/NCPERS%20Research%20Series_2015_Transition%20Costs.p
df [https://perma.cc/KKE5-GEZS].
127. Id.
128. Zelinsky, supra note 41, at 453.
129. NAT’L CONF. ON PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., supra note 126, at 2 (“Most public
sector employers offer both a traditional [defined benefit] plan, funded with
employer contributions and most often employee contributions, and a [defined
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investment returns expected after switching from a defined benefit to a
defined contribution plan may shrink by one to two percent over the life
of the participant.130 Although experts anticipate that this difference may
stabilize as defined contribution participants mature and retirees invest more
conservatively in retirement, the apparent savings from switching to a defined
contribution plan do not come from increased investment returns and actually
result in reduced investment returns.131 Reduced investment returns, however,
are a small concession to make for future retirees’ pensions to be protected
from the unpredictability of the investment markets.
In addition to the stability that a defined contribution plan can provide for
an employee, it allows the employee to have more autonomy over her
retirement savings. In a culture that places a high value on private property
and personal freedom, an individualized notion of retirement savings carries
tremendous appeal.132
B. Minimize Moral Hazard Through Lawmakers and Taxpayers
People often lack the incentive to guard against risk when it comes to
making decisions that do not affect them personally—a concept known as
“moral hazard.”133 A clear example of the effects of this principle is
evident in many public pension systems in which the political leaders and
board members making decisions regarding large pensions often are not
affected personally by the consequences of those decisions.134 Indeed,
“[s]hort-term political manipulations” have caused long-term detriment to
public employee retirement systems.135 Moral hazard issues typically do
not occur in the private sector because of the absence of political risks
contribution] plan, typically a §457 deferred compensation plan or §403(b)
defined contribution plan funded with employee contributions.”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Zelinsky, supra note 41, at 469.
133. A moral hazard is a circumstance that either creates an incentive for
someone to act inefficiently from an economic evaluation or removes the risks
that usually would be the consequence of inefficient acts. Moral Hazard,
WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012) (“The moral
hazard of agency is present in the immunity of legal officials and poor oversight
of corporate officials, so that neither is likely to be held accountable for their
mistakes or misdeeds.”).
134. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for
Rationalizing Public Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (2012)
(showing statistics that fault political dimension, or moral hazard, as the
predominant source of the public pension problem).
135. Anenson, supra note 15, at 35.
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associated with public pension.136 Remedial procedures should attempt to
“restrain political leaders who are incentivized to supply potentially
excessive benefits . . . that demand such benefits for their members without
regard for whether these obligations can be met.”137 Corrective measures
to address the issue of moral hazard should be approached through two
major avenues: (1) promoting lawmaker responsibility; and (2) addressing
taxpayer passivity.
1. Promote Lawmaker Responsibility
The first approach is to impose a duty on lawmakers to be more
fiscally responsible. Elected officials are often criticized for spending
“public dollars with less care than they would spend private dollars.”138 A
common problem is that pension benefits usually are increased during
economic boom cycles but then are not decreased during bust cycles.139
To avoid this ratchet effect,140 Louisiana should impose modified state
funding requirements, divert from budget provisions that promote
underfunding, and enact prohibitions against the misuse of fund assets.141
An example of the moral hazard problem in Louisiana is evident in
both the responsibilities and composition of the board of trustees for
TRSL. The board of trustees has the “full power to invest and reinvest
available funds and to hold, purchase, sell, assign, transfer, and dispose of
any of the . . . investments of the system.” 142 Of course, these actions are
to be “taken in compliance with the rules,” but, interestingly, the trustees
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 36; see also Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, Pension Funding
in the Public Sector, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 278, 282–83 (1994).
139. Anenson, supra note 15, at 36; see also Hylton, supra note 134, at 421–
22. When the housing bubble formed between 2000 and 2006, there was a dramatic
increase in property tax revenues. State and local governments had an influx in cash
and responded to union demands by increasing employee benefits, often at decreased
contribution levels. Id.
140. See ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1989).
141. Anenson, supra note 15, at 37. See generally Kathleen Paisley, Public
Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee Investment
Decisions, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 188 (1986) (seeking federal regulation of
trustee investment decisions); Sharon Reece et al., Regulating Public Pension
Fund Investments: The Role of Federal Legislation, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 101 (1992)
(advocating federal tax policy to promote state pension funds to target certain
kinds of investments in the state).
142. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:851 (2017).
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establish the rules.143 Board members establish the regulations in
accordance with the provision of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 11:263.144
Each fiduciary or trustee running the financial operations of the system are
held to a “prudent-man” standard, that is, he must “act with the care, skill,
prudence, . . . diligence[,] . . . [and] reasonable care” of a prudent
institutional investor under the circumstances.145
Although TRSL is governed by strict and specific rules through
legislation, it is curious that the board of trustees, which governs TRSL’s
financial decisions, is made up of 17 people, a third of whom are not
members of the pension program.146 Thus, although this one-third has a
large portion of the votes, their retirement funds are not affected personally
by the consequences of their votes. Because high-ranking officials in both
the education and government systems comprise the one-third group,147
they likely have unequal bargaining power when it comes to decisions
regarding TRSL’s pension funds.
2. Address Taxpayer Passivity
The second approach requires employers, pension boards, and the
legislature to target taxpayers’ passivity.148 This step is crucial to “make the
financial effects of pension reform more salient.”149 To encourage public
response, politicians must “inform and enable” taxpayers to participate in
the running of public pensions.150 Taxpayer involvement can be
accomplished through three mechanisms.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 11:263(B)–(C). Ironically enough, the legislature has provided a
mechanism to deal with any excess funds in the instance of the system absolving.
“[I]f the system shall be terminated and all obligations under the system are fully
funded and provided for, then any excess funds held by the system shall be
returned to the employer.” Id. § 11:856.
146. The board of trustees for “TRSL” is made up of 17 people, 12 of whom
are voting members of the program; the other five are not members. Id. § 11:822.
147. The state superintendent of education, the state treasurer, the commissioner
of administration, a member of the House Committee on Retirement appointed by
the speaker of the House of Representatives, and the chairman of the Retirement
Committee of the Senate of the Louisiana Legislature. § 11:822(A)(1)–(6).
148. Anenson, supra note 15, at 42.
149. Id.
150. Id. See Hylton, supra note 134, at 471–72 (recommending reforms that
“encourage taxpayers to function like shareholders and others with a serious stake
in the financial health of a private enterprise”).
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First, the public needs to understand and appreciate the magnitude of state
public pension liabilities.151 Louisiana voters likely will be more critical of
policy changes if fully informed of the dire situation of their own pensions.
Due to taxpayer disinterest, many of the problems with public pensions have
gone unnoticed through the last several decades, and only recently has
scholarly interest ignited discussion of the topic.152 Research shows that
academic interest in public pension liabilities is a recent phenomenon and
usually corresponds with financial obstacles suffered in various economies.153
Because pension policy changes have long-term effects, taxpayers should
show constant concern, not just during an economic downturn.
Second, the lack of uniformity in the pension systems has “further
complicate[d] comparisons of reported information among public pension
systems.”154 Inconsistent reporting comes as a result of different assumptions
about what determines liabilities, which confuse the reported information that
is dispersed to the public.155 Assumptions that are inconsistently reported
include demographics, assumed rates of return on investments, other
economic indicators, and information about the plan.156 One of the solutions
to disjointed reporting procedures is for Louisiana to consolidate its systems
for purposes of reporting or disclose data separately for each system within
the state. Implementing the uniform criteria for reporting within and between
states would permit a complete and transparent evaluation of each system.157
Third, the board of trustees for each pension system, as well as the
governmental entities involved, must be held to a higher standard for
accurate reporting.158 In many states, the reporting methods understate
151. Anenson, supra note 15, at 42.
152. Stephen P. D’Arcy et al., Optimal Funding of State Employee Pension
Systems, 66 J. RISK & INS. 345, 347 (1999) (comparing the volume of research
done on private pension funding with the lack of research on state pension
funding).
153. Id.
154. Anenson, supra note 15, at 44.
155. Mitchell & Smith, supra note 138, at 288 (discussing various methods
used by actuaries to determine pension plan liabilities).
156. Anenson, supra note 15, at 44. See generally NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, NEA
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND MEMBER ADVOCACY, CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE
PUBLIC EDUCATION PENSION PLANS 93 (2016), https://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE
/CharacteristicsLargePubEdPensionPlans2016.pdf [https://perma .cc/LUD8-MT8T].
157. Anenson, supra note 15, at 44. So far, only Wyoming and Maryland have
adopted the substance of the uniform law. Id. at 46. More states should consider
enacting a uniform law to ensure clear and complete information to those
monitoring the system and to create political incentives for leaders who address
pension difficulties.
158. Anenson, supra note 15, at 46.
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taxpayer liability, and the magnitude of fiscal stress is misrepresented.159 The
lower the reporting, the lower the apparent amount of contributions that are
owed to the plans, thus creating the appearance that excess funds exist that
can be used elsewhere.160 These misrepresentations of the extent of fiscal
stress are frequently credited as contributing to the imminent demise of many
public pension plans.161 Implementing these mechanisms to reduce taxpayer
passivity will lead to an increased demand in legislative responsibility and
therefore an increase in pension stability.
C. Incentivize Public Employees to Maximize Current Contributions
Because of the unstable nature of public pensions, “[w]orkers today
must save to gain a secure retirement.”162 Researchers recently examined
the existing options that provide encouragement for future retirees to take
more ownership of their retirement.163 One option offered by the federal
government provides traditional incentives for saving through favorable
tax treatment for employer plans and IRAs.164 Although the IRA incentive
involves a substantial loss of government revenue, the growth of IRA
program use has had a significant impact on retirement savings.165 With
the rising popularity of the IRA program, there is ongoing debate about
whether the use of this savings program is actually because of the
government tax incentive.166

159. Id.
160. See generally J. Fred Giertz & Leslie E. Papke, Public Pension Plans:
Myths and Realities for State Budgets, 60 NAT. TAX J. 305, 305–23 (2007)
(finding evidence that assumptions are manipulated in order to lower the
necessary contributions to pension plans).
161. Id.
162. STEVEN A. SASS, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C., NO. 16-15, CAN WE
INCREASE RETIREMENT SAVING? 1 (Sept. 2016), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/up
loads/2016/08/IB_16-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B8W-FSZQ].
163. Id.
164. Individual Retirement Account, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).
165. SASS, supra note 162, at 2. “The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates
the cost in foregone revenue for 401(k)s and IRAs at $110 billion in 2015. These
plans hold a tremendous amount of retirement savings–$13.6 trillion at the end of
2015.” Id.
166. Id. Some research supports the claim that small changes in tax incentives
have little effect on the saving of high-income workers, who are the workers
getting the largest financial benefit from the favorable tax treatment of retirement
saving. Id.
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Further, there is conclusive research affirming that behavior incentives,
as opposed to tax incentives, can increase retirement savings significantly
on an individual level.167 Congress encouraged the use of behavioral
initiatives by passing the Pension Protection Act (“PPA”) of 2006.168
Congress enacted the PPA primarily because, although individuals were
saving, they often were not saving enough to maximize the potential of their
investments by receiving the entire employer match.169 The PPA attempted
to remedy this problem by creating incentives for employers to set up
automatic enrollment arrangements with automatic escalation features;
expanding tax benefits for low- and moderate-income households by
making the “saver’s credit”170 permanent and indexing it for inflation; and
allowing individuals to have their directly deposited federal income tax
refunds split among as many as three different accounts to eliminate
temptation to spend the funds.171
A decade later, research shows that the automatic escalation feature
alone has increased overall 401(k) accumulations, particularly for low to
moderate-income groups.172 Although these tools sometimes are associated
with a reduction in employee contributions and employer match rates,173 the

167. Id. at 5.
168. Ericca Maas, Aim of Pension Protection Act is to Increase Personal
Retirement Savings, FED. R ESERVE B ANK OF M INNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2007),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/community-dividend/aim-of-pensionprotection-act-is-to-increase-personal-retirement-savings [https://perma.cc/78K9-F7
K6].
169. Id.
170. The “[s]aver’s [c]redit” is known formally as the Retirement Savings
Contribution Credit. Codified in Internal Revenue Code § 25B, this credit can be
applied against the total amount of taxes owed by a taxpayer. The credit is
calculated by taking 10%, 20%, or 50% of the amount the taxpayer has
contributed to a qualified retirement savings, up to a maximum credit of $2,000.
Contributions that are considered “[q]ualified [r]etirement [s]avings” include
those made to a traditional or Roth IRA; 401(k); SIMPLE IRA; SARSEP; 403(b);
501(c)(18) or governmental 457(b) plan; and voluntary after-tax employee
contributions to qualified retirement and 403(b) plans. Retirement Savings
Contribution Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.irs
.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirement-savings-contributionssavers-credit [https://perma.cc/8PQH-D2VN].
171. Maas, supra note 168.
172. Robert Powell, Time for a Pension Protection Act of 2016/17,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/time-for-apension-protection-act-of-201617-2016-08-25 [https://perma.cc/4STB-NQFD].
173. SASS, supra note 162, at 5.
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conclusive report on the effects of behavioral incentives shows that
behavior interventions can increase retirement savings significantly.174
Several solutions exist that, if taken together, can address the deeply
rooted issues in public pension systems across the nation. Requiring
existing pensions to have balanced accounts and replacing defined benefit
with defined contribution plans will help stabilize funds. Encouraging
lawmakers to avoid moral hazard and increasing taxpayer awareness will
spurn thoughtful resolutions and informed voting. Lastly, providing
incentives for public employees to maximize their current savings plans
will help them more thoroughly prepare for retirement. By implementing
these affirmative approaches, Louisiana could strengthen its struggling
pension programs and provide a secure future for its retirees.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana’s pension systems, particularly LASERS and TRSL, are
severely underfunded because of overspending and a shortage of revenue.
There are several suggested approaches for dealing with this
underfunding. First, and most importantly, the state should reject the notion
that public employees—particularly teachers—should opt into Social
Security through a Section 218 Agreement. Second, current defined benefit
plans should transition to a defined contribution structure, shifting the risk
and responsibility of investment to the employee. Third, lawmakers and
pensions boards must refrain from engaging in moral hazard issues that can
lead to irresponsible decisions regarding pension funds. Finally, more
incentives should be given to employees to have greater autonomy over
their own pension plans, either through governmental tax benefits or
employer-created pension contributions. Implementing these structures
will provide stability to suffering pension programs in Louisiana, offering
overall economic stability to the state.
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